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plicable and not within the terms of the section, 955, above cited.
All the cases invoked are consistent with this view.
Our conclusion, therefore, is
,
that the right o
f
action terminated
with the death of the defendant. Were it held otherwise, for the
reasons urged b
y counsel, there would be one rule o
f
action in this
respect governing suits b
y
the United States for penalties for infrac
tions o
f its copyright laws in one state, and another in other states,
dependent upon local legislation respecting the survival o
f
action.
Wide U
.
S
.
v
. Richardson, 9 FED. REP. 804; Sarony v. Burrow-Giles Lith.
Co., infra.
SARoNY v
. BURRow-GILEs LITHOGRAPHIC Co.
(Circuit Court, S. D
.
New York. April Term, 1883.)
1
. CoNSTITUTIONALITY of STATUTE–WHEN Court will, DECLARE Word.
The court should hesitate long, and be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt,
before pronouncing an act o
f congress invalid. The argument should amount
almost to a demonstration. If doubt exists, the act should be sustained,—the
presumption is in favor o
f
its validity.
2
. CopyRIGHT-REV. ST. § 4952—PHOTOGRAPHS AND NEGATIVEs.
- The act o
f congress (Rev. St. § 4952) granting copyright protection to photo
graphs, and negatives thereof, is not so clearly unconstitutional as to authorize
the court a
t
mist prius to declare it invalid.
3
. SAME–1NsekTING IN CopyRIGHT, NAME, AND DATE.
The object o
f inscribing upon copyright articles the word “copyright,” with
the year when the copyright was taken out, and the name o
f
the party taking
it out, (Laws 1874, c. 301,) is to give notice of the copyright to the public; to
prevent a person from being punished who ignorantly and innocently repro
duces the photograph without knowledge o
f
the protecting copyright.
4
,
SAME–INITIAL of CIIRISTIAN NAME AND FULL SURNAME.
Inserting in such a notice the initial o
f
the Christian name and the full sur
name is a sufficient compliance with the law ; it does not violate the letter o
f
the law, and accomplishes its object.
This was an action at law for the violation of the plaintiff's copy
right o
f
a photograph o
f
Oscar Wilde, which the defendant had copied
b
y
the process known a
s chromo-lithography. It was admitted on
the trial that the plaintiff had taken a
ll
the steps required b
y
law to
secure the copyright except to insert his Christian name in the no
tice, and there was n
o dispute a
s
to the number o
f copies printed by
the defendant, the value thereof, o
r
the number on hand. The notice
o
f copyright on the plaintiff's photographs was as follows: “Copy
right, 1882, b
y
N
. Sarony.” A jury was waived, and the case was
argued upon questions of law only, which appear in the opinion.
Guernsey Sackett and A
.
T
. Gurlitz, for plaintiff.
Stine dº Calman and D. Calman, for defendant.
CoxE, J. This is an action to recover—pursuant to section 4965
o
f
the Revised Statutes—for the infringement o
f
a copyright o
f
a pho
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tograph. Two defenses are interposed: First, that the act securing
copyright protection to photographs is unconstitutional; second, that
the plaintiff, in printing upon the photograph the initial letter of hi
s
Christian name, N., instead o
f
the name itself—Napoleon—has not
given the notice required b
y
the statute.
Article 1
,
§ 8
,
o
f
the constitution vests in congress the power to
make laws “to promote the progress o
f
science and useful arts b
y
securing, for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries.”
Upon the authority o
f this constitutional grant congress extended,
o
r
assumed to extend, copyright protection to “any citizen " " "
who shall be the author, inventor, designer, or proprietor of any
* * * photograph or negative thereof.” (Section 4952, Rev. St.)
The contention of the defendant, briefly stated, is this: That there
was n
o constitutional warrant for this act; that a photographer is
not a
n author, and a photograph is not a writing. The court should
hesitate long and be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt before pro
nouncing the invalidity of an act of congress. The argument should
amount almost to a demonstration. If doubt exists the act should
b
e sustained. The presumption is in favor o
f
its validity. This has
long been the rule—a rule applicable to all tribunals, and particularly
to courts sitting at nisi privs. Were it otherwise, endless complica
tions would result, and a law which, in one circuit, was declared un
constitutional and void, might, in another, be enforced as valid.
The result o
f
a careful consideration o
f
the learned and exhaustive
briefs submitted, and o
f
such further research and examination as
time has permitted, is that I do not feel that clear and unhesitating
conviction which should possess the mind o
f
the court in such cases.
Many cogent reasons can be and have been urged in favor of the va
.
lidity of the statute. It is
,
however, sufficient for the purposes of this
case to say that in the judgment o
f
the court the question is involved
in doubt. This view is sustained b
y
a recent decision o
f
the judges
o
f
the eastern district o
f Pennsylvania, where the precise question
was under consideration. The case (Schreiber v. Thornton) is not ye
t
reported," but the facts may be found in Schreiber v. Sharpless, 6 FED,
REp. 175, where there was a controversy evidently growing out of
the same transaction.
Regarding the other defense, above stated, I have little doubt.
The object of the statute was to give notice of the copyright to th
e
public; to prevent a person from being punished who ignorantly and
innocently reproduces the photograph without knowledge of the pro
tecting copyright. It would be too narrow a construction to say that
the plaintiff, when he placed “N. Sarony” upon the card, did no
t
comply with the terms o
f
the statute requiring “the name of the
party” to be placed there. If the letter of the law is not violated,
1 See post, p
.
603.
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and its object accomplished, it is enough. The strict technical rules
of pleading in the criminal courts furnish but slight analogy for the
guidance of the court in determining what interpretation shall be
given to the statute.
The English courts, construing an act very similar in terms, have
frequently upheld notices of copyright obnoxious to all of the defend
ant's criticisms. Although innumerable notices have in this country
been worded in the precise form adopted by the plaintiff, and many
of these copyrights and notices have been the subject of judicial in
vestigation, the precise question here presented, though it might have
been raised, has not apparently been decided. No American author
ity directly in point has been cited by counsel or found by the court.
It follows that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment, pursuant to the
terms of the stipulation.
LITERARY PROPERTY AT CoMMON LAW. At the common law an author
had the sole right of first printing and publishing for sale his writings;" yet,
after such publication made by him, it has been doubted whether he possessed
any property rights in the production which could be infringed by republica
tion by a stranger. Such; at any rate, seems to have been the opinion of the
supreme court of the United States,” although the house of lords, by a vote of
seven to four, laid down the proposition that the author and his assigns had
the sole right of printing and publishing in perpetuity by the common law.”
But copyright protection was secured in England by 8 Anne, c. 19, and in this
country in 1790, when congress passed the first of our copyright acts. And
it is now agreed, both in England and in this country, that copyright exists
only by statute;" that an author has no exclusive property in his published
works, except when he has secured and protected it by compliance with the
copyright laws of the United States.” “When a person enters the field of
authorship he can secure to himself the exclusive right to his writings by a
copyright under the laws of the United States. If he publishes anything of
which he is the author or compiler, either under his own proper name or an
assumed name, without protecting it by copyright, it becomes public property,
and any person who chooses to do so has the right to republish it
,
and to state
the name o
f
the author in such form in the book, either upon the title-page
o
r otherwise, as to show who was the writer or author thereof.” 8
WHo ARE PROTECTED BY CopyRIGHT. The proprietor or owner o
f
a work
has not, in that character alone, any right o
f copyright. It is only to authors
and inventors, o
r
to persons representing the author o
r inventor, that congress
has any authority to grant a copyright. And when a person comes into court,
asking for the protection o
f
a copyright, it is necessary for him to show that
he is the author o
r inventor of the work, or that he has an exclusive right,
lawfully derived from the author or inventor.” To constitute one an author,
1 Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, (1769;) French Pet. 591; Parton v. Prang. 3 Cliff. 537; Rees v
v
. Maguire, 55 How. Pr. 471; Boucicault v. Fox, Peltzer, 75 Ill. 475,478.
5 Blatchf. 88, 97. 5 Clayton v
. Stone, 2 Paine, 382; Bartlett v
.
2See Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 657. Crittenden, 5 McLean, 32; Pulte v
. Derby, Id.
3 Donaldson v
. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408. 328; Stowe v
. Thomas, 2 Wall. Jr. 547.
4 Jeffrey's v
. Boosey, 4 H. L. S38; Reade v
.
Con- • Clemens v
. Belford, 14 Fed. Rep. 728, 730.
quest, 9 C
.
B
.
(N. S.) 768; Wheaton v. Peters, 8 7 Greene v. Bishop, 1 Cliff. 186, 193; Little v.
Gould, 2 Blatchſ. 181.
v.17, no.7–38
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he must, by his own intellectual labor applied to the materials of his compo
sition, produce an arrangement or compilation new in itself.”
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN COPYRIGHT AND LETTERS PATENT. In Baker v.
Selden,” decided in the United States supreme court in 1879, Mr. Justice
BRADLEY stated and illustrated the difference between a copyright and letters
patent. The complainant had copyrighted a book explaining a particular sys
tem of book-keeping, to which book were annexed certain forms or blanks,
consisting of ruled lines and headings illustrating the system, and showing
how it was to be used and carried out in practice. It was claimed that the
copyright protected the system, because no one could use the system without
using substantially the same ruled lines and headings which he had appended
to his book in illustration of it
.
The court held otherwise, and that there
was a clear distinction between the book as such and the art which it was
intended to illustrate. The copyright protected the book, but the protection
o
f
the art was within the province o
f
letters patent. “To give to the author
o
f
the book an exclusive property in the art described therein, when no ex
amination o
f
its novelty has ever been officially made, would be a surprise
and a fraud upon the public.”
NoM DE PLUME As A TRADE-NAME OR TRADE-MARK. In Clemens v. Bel
..ford,” better known, perhaps, as the “Mark Twain’’ case, the novel idea
was advanced that an author who had not copyrighted his work had an ex
clusive right to his literary property under the law applicable to trade
marks, upon the theory that the assumed name under which he had written
was a trade-name o
r
trade-mark. This ingenious idea was very seriously
urged upon the attention o
f
the court, but all to no purpose; and it was laid
down that the invention o
f
a mom d
e plume gave a writer no increase of right
over another who used his own name; that an author could not, b
y
the adop
tion o
f
a mom de plume, be allowed to defeat the well-settled rules o
f
the com
mon law, that the publication o
f
a literary work, without copyright, was a
dedication to the public, after which any one might republish it
.
“No pseu
donym, however ingenious, itovel, o
r quaint, can give aſ author any more
rights than he would have under his own name.”
LECTURES. The delivery o
f
a lecture is not such a publication o
f
it as de
prives the lecturer o
f
his property rights therein." And it seems there is no
right to report phonographically or otherwise a lecture which has been de
livered before a public audience, and which the lecturer desires to use again in
like manner. In England it was provided b
y
statute that no person, allowed
for a certain fee to be present a
t any lecture delivered at any place, should be
deemed to be licensed to publish such lecture o
n
account o
f having been per
mitted to attend the lecture, etc.”
ABRIDGMENTs. Abridgments are considered to be in the nature of new
and meritorious works, and if done in good faith they constitute no violation
o
f copyright." Where books are only colorably shortened the rule would be
different.” -
TRANSLATIONS. For a .ong time considerable doubt was entertained as to
whether the mere act o
f giving to a literary composition the new dress of an:
other language entitled one to the protection o
f copyright. But it is now
, Atwill v. Ferrett, 2 Blatchſ. 39, 46; Gray v
.
55 & 6 Wm. IV. c. 65. See Abernethy ".
Russell, 1 Story, 11. - Hutchinson, 3 L. J. Ch. 209.
2 101 U. S. 99. 6 Gyles v
. wilcox, 2 Atk. 141; Dodsley v. Kin:
3.14 Fed. Rep. 728. nersley, Ambler, 403; whittingham v. Wooler.”
4 See Crowe v
. Aiken, 2 Biss. 208; Keene v
.
Swanst. 42s, 430; Tonson v
. Walker, 3 Swanst,
Kimball, 16 Gray, 545, 551; Palamer v. De Witt, 672.
47 N. Y. 532. 7 See Cop. Copyr. 37.
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well settled that a translator may copyright his translation." It is no in
fringement of the copyright to translate a work which the author has already
had translated into the same language, although he may have secured a copy
right for that translation.” In the case first cited in the above note, Mr.
Justice GRIER said: “To make a good translation of a work often requires
more learning, talent, and judgment than was required to write the original.
Many can transfer from one language to another, but few can translate. To
call the translations of an author's ideas and conceptions into another lan
guage a copy of his book; would be an abuse of terms, and arbitrary judicial
legislation.” -
MUSICAL. CoMPositions. In Thomas v. Lennon * the composer of an ora
torio permitted the words and vocal parts of his oratorio, set to an accompani
ment for the piano, to be published in a book. This publication contained
all the melodies and harmonies of the original oratorio. It had in the mar
gin references to the particular instruments which were to be employed in
playing the different parts of the piece, or many of them. Two questions
were involved in the case. The first was, whether the publication of the book,
with the score for the piano and the marginal notes, gave to every one the right
to reproduce or copy the orchestral score if he could. And it was answered in
the negative. And the second question was, whether a new orchestration,
not copied from the original by memory, report, or otherwise, but made from
the book, was an infringement of the plaintiff's rights. In answering this
question the court said: “An opera is more like a patented invention than
like a common book; he who shall obtain similar results, better or worse, by
similar means, though the opportunity is furnished by an unprotected book,
should be held to infringe the rights of the composer.””
DRAMATIC CoMPositions. The representation upon the stage of an un
printed work is not a publication which deprives the author or his assignee
of his property rights therein, and does not interfere with his claim to ob
tain a copyright therefor." As the mere representation of a play does not
of itself dedicate it to the public, it has been held, where a copy of such a
play has been unlawfully made by persons witnessing its performance, and
who have reproduced it by phonographic report or notes, that its representa
tion from such copy will be restrained by injunction." In 1860 the supreme
court of Massachusetts, in Keene v. Kimball,” decided “that the literary pro
prietor of an unprinted play cannot, after making or sanctioning its repre
sentation before an indiscriminate audience, maintain an objection to any
such literary or dramatic republication by others, as they may be enabled, either
directly or secondarily, to make from its being retained in the memory of any of
the audience.” In 1882 the same question again came up in this same cour*
in Tompkins v. Halleck.” The whole question was elaborately argued, and
very carefully considered, being rightly deemed one of great importance. An
injunction was asked to restrain the representation of a drama called “The
World,” which had been reproduced by a person who had attended the repre
sentation of the play at Wallack's theatre in New York on several occasions,
and on each occasion had committed as much of the play as he could to mem
1 Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2348; Burnet v.
Chetwood, 2 Mer. 441; Prince Albert v. Strange,
2 De G. & S. 693; Wyatt v. Barnard, 3 Wes. & B.
77; Emerson v. Davies, 3 Story, 768, 78.); Shook
v. Rankin, 6 Biss. 480.
* Stowe v. Thomas, 2 Wall. Jr. 547. See Mur
ray v. Boque, 17 Jur. 219; 1 Drew, 353.
314 Fed. Rep. S49.
* See, also, to same effect, Boosey v. Fairlie, L.
R. 7 Ch. D. v. 301; affirmed, 4 App, Cas. 711.
5 Roberts v. Myers, U. S. C. C. Mass. Dist. 23
Law Rep. 396; Keene v. Kimball, 16 Gray, 545.
6 Boucicault v. Fox, 5 Blatchf. C. C. 87; Shook
v. Daly, 49 How. Pr. 366; Palmer v. De Witt, 2
Sweeney, 530; 7 Rob. 530; 36 How. Pr. 222; and
47 N. Y. 532; French v. Maguire, 55 How. Pr. 471,
Shook v. Rankin, 6 Biss. 477; Boucicault v. Wood,
2 Biss. 34; Crowe v. Aiken, Id. 208.
716 Gray, 515.
8133 Mass. 32.
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ory, and had then dictated it to another until the copy was complete. It was
not shown that any notes were taken in the theatre. The court overruled
Keene v. Kimball, and granted an injunction restraining the representation of
a play, which had not been copyrighted, from a copy obtained by a spectator
attending a public representation by the proprietor for money, and afterwards
writing it from memory. See, to the same effect, French v. Connelly."
There are to be found dicta to the contrary, which need not be here consid.
ered. They are believed to be based on Keene v. Kimball.
REPORTs—JUDICIAL DECISIONS. It is laid down that any person who
employs another to prepare a work may, by virtue of the contract of employ
ment, become the owner of the literary property therein.” Consequently,
the people who employ and pay judges are said to be the rightful owners
of the literary property in the opinions written by them, and the United
States government might secure to itself copyright in the decisions pronounced
in the federal courts, while the several state governments have the same right
as to the opinions announced by the judges in the state courts. It is settled
that no reporter has or can have any copyright in the written opinions of a
court, and that the judges cannot confer on him any such right.” All that
the reporter can copyright is his own individual work—the head-notes, the
statement of the case, analysis or summary of the arguments of counsel, the
index, etc.”
NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINEs. In England there is a provision relating
to copyright in magazines, reviews, and other periodicals." Newspapers are
not expressly mentioned in the act, but it is held that one may have copy
right therein.” In the United States there is no express provision in the
copyright law as to newspapers and magazines, but the opinion is that there
is nothing in the law of copyright to prevent valid copyright from vesting in
a magazine or a newspaper.”
-
PHoToGRAPHS. In Wood v. Abbott,” a photograph was held not to be a
print, cut, or engraving under section 1 of the act of 1831. But in 1865, con
gress, acting upon the authority of the constitutional provision set forth in
the decision in the particular case, extended copyright protection to photo
graphs by expressly including them among the articles for which copyright
was provided. Section 4952, Rev. St.
In England it has been provided by statute that the author, being a Brit:
ish subject or resident within the dominions of the crown, of every original
painting, drawing, and photograph, shall have the sole and exclusive right
of copying, engraving, reproducing, and multiplying such painting or draw:
ing, and the design thereof, or such photograph, and the negative thereof."
Paintings, drawings, and photographs were the last of the branches of the
fine arts to be recognized as worthy of copyright protection in England.
Previous to the adoption of the above provision, an act had been passed giv
ing copyright in sculptures and engravings. And in most European coun
tries copyright protection has been extended through the whole range of the
fine arts.” t
Upon the question raised in the principal case, as to whether a photogra
pher is an author, and a photograph a writing, within the meaning of the con
stitutional provision vesting power in congress to pass copyright laws, it ap
1 N. Y. Week. Dig. 196. 55 & 6 Viet. c. 45, $18.
2 Drone, Copyr. 162. * Cox v. Land water Journal Co. L. R. 9 P4.
3 Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 668. 324; Platt v. waiter, 17 L. T. (N.S.) 159; Er
4.Wheaton v. Peters, supra; Backus v. Gould, parte Foss, 2 De G. & J.239
7 How. 798; Little v. Hall, 18 How, 165; Paige v. 7 Drone, Copyr. 169.
Banks, 7 Blatchf. 152; Little v. Gould, 2 Blatchf. 85 Blatchf. 325.
165, 362; Paige v. Banks, 13 Wall. 608; Myers v. 925 & 26 Vict. c. 68.
Callaghan, 5 Fed. Rep. 726. 10Cop. Law Copyr. 388.
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pears that grave and serious doubts may be entertained. It seems that the
court, in the principal case, was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
a photograph was not a writing. There was no escape, therefore, from hold
ing the law constitutional.
But, laying aside the constitutional question involved, the question may be
raised whether a photograph deserves copyright protection at all. The an
swer must depend upon whether it constitutes artistic work or not. This
question has been the subject of considerable consideration in France, and is
fully discussed in Pouillet's Propriete Litteraire et Artistique. Through the
kindness of Mr. William Alexandre Heydecker, of Brooklyn, New York, who
has taken considerable interest in copyright litigation, and made an excellent
translation of the chapter on Property in Photographs, the FEDERAL RE
PostFR is enabled to present the substance of that discussion:
“The question as to whether the products of photography constitute artis
tic works or not, and are protected by the law of 1793, has been much dis- .
cussed. Several theories have been advanced. It has been maintained, ab
solutely, that the law of 1793 does not apply to photography. M. Thomas,
at the time imperial advocate, speaking of the subject before the tribunal of
the Seine, urged this view as follows:
“‘The law of 1793 has taken a certain number of arts; it has recognized
that, in general, no productions were obtained in their domains without ge
nius, and none ever without a certain labor of the mind; it has provided that
these deserve protection; it has specified them, it has enumerated them, and
it has protected equally, and I may almost say blindly, all their products. The
law of 1793 protects paintings; it protects without distinction all such prod
ucts, good or bad, the immortal works of genius, or the ephemeral and gro
tesque conceptions of the most idle fantasy. The judge has naught to do with
the degree of perfection of the product; the counterfeited object is a painting;
that is sufficient, and without this the law would be as impracticable as it
would be dangerous. If, therefore, photography were protected by the law of
1793, as it could only be for the same reasons as paintings, it would be pro
tected without any distinctions, and without the judge having to determine
the artistic value. * * * The law of 1793 does not protect the labor of
thought previous to execution; not that kind of invention which is the work
in the mind alone, but it protects the mental labor in its material product.
The law of 1793 is essentially a practical law; it protects the vendible, the
commercial product as it comes from the hands of an intelligent man, who,
looking at the practical side of things, asks the law to enable him to live
by his labor. But, if the law does not protect the thought without the exe
cution, so in all the arts which it does protect this intervention of intelligence,
as the director in the execution, is always to be found. It is never a purely
material labor; it is always the intelligence of man expressing what his intel
ligence has conceived, guiding his brush or his graver, and contending with
them against material difficulties. If photography, as a work of intelligence
and of mind, is to be protected, it is
,
then, not only in the search for the sub
ject that the intervention o
f intelligence and o
f
mind ought to be found; es
pecially will it be necessary that, in the execution, should also be found this
intelligence o
f
man acting upon the instrument. Is that what takes place?
All of the intellectual and artistic work of the photograper is anterior to the ma
terial execution; his mind o
r
his genius have nothing to do with this execution;
up to the point where the photographer can be compared to the painter, by
the creation o
f
his work in his imagination, the law does not yet afford pro
tection; and when the idea is about to take shape as a production,-when the
protection o
f
the law is about to extend to this production,-no comparison is
possible. On the one hand, the painter continues his work; his intelligence
directs his hand; he corrects his first thought, he modifies it
,
h
e perfects it
,
598 -
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and up to the last moment he impresses on it the stamp of his own personal
ity. On the other hand, the photographer erects his apparatus, he thence
forth remains a complete stranger to what is taking place; light does its
work: a splendid but independent agent has accomplished all. The man may
disappear a
t
the beginning o
f
the operation; it will, nevertheless, be per
formed without the assistance o
f
his intelligence o
r
his mind; his personality
will be lacking to the product at the only time in which, according to the
spirit o
f
the law, this personality could afford him any protection. Therefore,
from the legal point o
f view, photographs are not products of the intelli
gence and the mind, susceptible o
f being protected by the law o
f
1793.”
“Thus it has been adjudged (1) that the products obtained b
y
the help o
f
photography do not present the essential characteristics o
f
works of art;
though they require a certain degree o
f
skill in the use o
f
the apparatus, and
show a
t
times the taste o
f
the operator in the choice and arrangement of the
subject o
r in the pose o
f
the model, they are yet but the result o
f
mechanical
process and o
f
chemical combinations which reproduce mechanically the
material objects, without the artist's talent being necessary to obtain them.
Trib. Civ. Seine, 12 Dec. 1863, aff. Disderi Pataille, 63, 396. (2) That even
though it be necessary, in order to obtain fine photographic proofs, to have
gone through a certain course o
f study on these subjects, and even though
the talent o
f
the operator may contribute much to the success o
f
the portraits
o
r
views which are desired, it is none the less certain that these products or
views are mechanically made, b
y
the action o
f light upon certain chemicals,
and, in this operation, genius can have no effect on the result to be obtained;
whence the consequence that photographic productions cannot be brought
under the category o
f
works o
f
art protected by the law of 1793. Trib. Corr.
Seine, 16 Mars, 1864, aff. Masson, Pataille, 64, 227.
-
“Second Theory. It is maintained, in opposition to the first, and in as abso.
lute a manner, that the products o
f photography constitute productions of
the mind in the sense o
f
the law, and should be, for this reason, protected by
it
.
“Article 1 o
f
the law o
f 1793, argued M. l'avocat imperial Bachelier, in
another case, ‘contains a
n enumeration, but article 7 contains the real spirit of
the law; what it protects is the work, and the work alone. A photograph is
a design, for it is a reproduction of nature b
y
a play o
f light and shade. It
is argued that photography cannot be protected b
y
a law which antedates it
b
y
nearly 60 years. That does not appear conclusive. What the law protects
is the picture—the work; and the result o
f photography is a picture, no matter
what the process. Drawings obtained b
y
means o
f
the diagraph and panto
graph have been considered works o
f art, and no one ever thought of main
taining that the process took from the drawing its artistic character, because,
in fact, it is only the result that is important. It cannot be denied that photo
graphic productions are often admirable pictures, though mechanical means
are used. The art is in the exercise o
f
the will in the choice of the subject;
o
f
the hour a
t
which to obtain certain effects o
f light; al
l
that is the creation
o
f
the man who reproduces nature, and never will it be true to say that there
is mechanical action only.” -
“M. A
. Rendu, the eminent advocate o
f
the Cour de Cassation, while de
fending before the Cour Supreme a decree o
f
the Cour de Paris, expressed
himself thus: “Artistic property is governed b
y
the law o
f 1793, and b
y
th
e
articles 425 and 427 o
f
the Penal Code. Without doubt these laws could not
provide specifically for a
ll
advances in the domain o
f art; art, like it
s
object,
is infinite; but, nevertheless, they are not confined to what is already known,
because they provide for “every production o
f
the mind and o
f genius which
belongs to the fine arts,” and they insure beforehand, to the author of any
work, the exclusive right of reproducing it
.
The Cour Supreme has given
to these laws the widest range. It has, b
y
numerous decrees, prescribed a
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distinction dear, without doubt, to certain artists of the first rank, true from
a purely speculative stand-point, but inexact in the reality of things, and inad
missible from a legal point of view: the distinction between the arts truly
so-called and the industrial arts. In our present condition of civilization it
must have been recognized that every work offering by its form and figure an
impress of the personality of its author, that every work worthy of being
called a production of the human mind,-is legally a work of art, whether it be
reserved for the admiration of people of taste, or destined to strengthen or em
bellish some industry. A blessed and fruitful alliance has, in our day, been
consummated between art and industry. The latter is not only to satisfy
material necessities, but the sentiment of the beautiful, and in order to do
this it must address itself to art. Thus it is not art which is lowered, but in
dustry which is raised and ennobled. * * * The human intelligence, even
in the domain of art, can produce nothing without material assistance;
though man's help be a tool, a machine, another's hand, he does not the less
produce a work of art, if he continues to exercise the faculties which are con
Cerned in that art: sentiment, mind, taste. When the sculptor makes use of
the precision compass, when the draughtsman employs the reducing mirror
or the chambre claire, it is always the thought of the artist which directs the
instrument, which guides and inspires the material means. Thought re
tains its supreme role. In photography, the apparatus takes the place, though
not entirely, of hand labor, the material part of the labor, but it leaves to
the artist, to its fullest extent, the labor of the mind.”
“Thus it has been adjudged, in this sense, that photographic images are pic
tures. Whatever may be their aesthetic value, however great may have been
the part played by the agents pressed into his service by the operator, it is
certain that there yet remains to him an important part: he determines the
aspect under which the subject of the picture is to be presented to the lumi
nous ray; he disposes the lines, and gives evidence, in a certain measure, of
taste, of discernment, of skill. The work which, without the exercise of these
various faculties, would not be brought forth, may thus be justly called a
work of the mind, and protected on this ground by the law of 1793. Paris,
12 Juin, 1863, aff. Meyer et Pierson, Pataille, 63,225.
“Intermediate Theory. Between these two theories there is an intermediate
one. The propositions enunciated are not contested. It is recognized that,
in photography, the apparatus takes a prominent place; but, at the same time,
it is not denied that in certain cases the work of the photographer reaches a
perfection, a degree of finish, which makes of it a veritable picture. This view
leaves, therefore, to the tribunals the matter of deciding, according to circum
stances, whether the photographic reproduction is or is not a work of art.
This theory is founded upon the following decisions: (1) That photographic
pictures should not be necessarily and in every case considered destitute of all
artistic character, nor ranked among the purely material works; in fact, these
pictures, though obtained by the help of a camera and under the influence of
light, may be, within limits and to a certain degree, the product of the
thought, of the mind, of the taste, and of the intelligence of the operator;
their perfection, independently of the manual skill, depends largely in the re
production of landscapes, upon the choice of the point of view, upon the com
bination of effects of light and shade, and, besides, in portraits, upon the pose
of the subject, upon the arrangement of the costume and accessories, all of
them matters concerning the artistic sentiment, which give to the work of the
photographer the stamp of his personality. Paris, 10 Avr. 1862, aff. Meyer et
Pierson, Pataille, 62, 113. (2) That the law, not having defined the charac
teristics which constitute, in an artistic product, a creation of the mind or of
genius, it appertains to the judges of the fact to declare whether the product
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omitted to their investigation is
,
by its nature, one o
f
those works o
f
art
which the law of 1793 protects; in particular, the decision b
y
which the judges
o
f
the fact decide that a photographic portrait is a production o
f
the mind
coming under the terms o
f
the law, is not under the control o
f
the Cour de Cas
sation. Rej. 28 Nov. 1862, aff. Meyer et Pierson, Pataille, 62,419. (3) That if
,
in
general, the reproduction o
f
a picture o
r
o
f
a portrait b
y photographic process
may not constitute a work o
f
art in the spirit o
f
the law, it is otherwise when
there is joined to the ordinary labor o
f
the photographer that o
f
the designer.
o
r any other artistic combination; in particular, the fact o
f
a photographic
inegative having been touched up b
y
a draughtsman and having undergone
important modifications, gives to it
,
unquestionably, the character o
f
a work
o
f
art. Paris, 29 Avr. 1864, aff. Duroni et Muller, Pataille, 64,235. (4) That
if the photographic products are not necessarily works which should be classed
in the category of fine arts, they can be considered as such, and be protected by
the law o
f 1793, when they are invested with the characteristics exacted b
y
that law; particularly, in a portrait, the pose, the arrangement of the clothing,
and the accessories, may give to the work the imprint o
f
the personality of the
photographer, and place him under the protection o
f
the law. Paris, 6 Mai,
1864, aff, Masson, Pataille, 64, 232. -
“Our Opinion. Of these three theories we do not hesitate, so far as we are
concerned, to adopt the second; but the last, especially, seems to us altogether
inadmissible. It may be argued that the work of the photographer is or is not
protected by the law, and, without agreeing with those who maintain the nega
tive, we, a
t least, understand their view. As to the intermediate opinion, it is
evidently contrary to the letter as well as to the spirit o
f
the law. It can
ilot, indeed, have come into the mind o
f
the legislator to transform our tri
bunals into academies, and to confide to our judges the duty of deciding that
this is art and that that is not. Are such powers granted to our judges in the
matters o
f drawing, o
f painting, and o
f sculpture; that is
,
in those depart
ments which are certainly regulated by the law o
f
1793? Can they say of one
painting that it is a work of art, and of another that it has in it nothing ar
.
tistic? Can they grant protection to the one and refuse it to the other? No;
the law is wiser; good or bad, whether it conform or not to the laws of tes
thetics, every painting, drawing, and piece o
f sculpture is a work of art. Thus
it was rightly said b
y
M
.
l'avocat imperial Thomas, in the conclusions which
we gave above, that it is impossible to avoid this alternative; either refuse
the title o
f
artistic works to all photographs, or grant it to all; outside of that
there is only room for arbitrariness, and, consequently, for danger, as well fo
r
the judge as for the litigant.
“Let us now come to the reasons which, in our estimation, justify the second
theory. The law o
f
1793 is a general law; we think we have shown that: it
protects, as we have seen, every production o
f
the mind, provided it be con
nected with the fine arts; and we have admitted, in common with all authors,
that a casting, even o
f
a natural object, comes under the provisions of the
law. How, after that, could we exclude photography? What impresses the
adversaries o
f
our theory is that, in photography, the apparatus plays so in
portant a role-even the preponderant role. What does that show? ... If th
e
painter, after having conceived his picture, should find the means of reprº
dacing it on the canvas with one stroke, just as he conceived it
,
would it be
denied that his work was a production o
f
the mind? What matters the
greater o
r
less rapidity and ease o
f
the execution? Is it not the conception,
however expressed, which constitutes the artistic work? The photographer
conceives his work; he arranges the accessories and play o
f light; he arranges
the distance o
f
his instrument according as he wants, in the reproduction,
either distinctness or size; thus, also, he obtains this or that effect of perspect.
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ive. After that, what matters the rapidity, the perfection, the fidelity of the
instrument with which he executes what he has conceived, arranged, created?
We have said many times already that the author's right was derived from
the creation which gives to the work its character of individuality. Is this
individuality lacking here? Is it not certain that two photographers, repro
ducing, each for himself, the same scene or the same model, will obtain two
pictures capable of being distinguished? There is
,
therefore, a creation in
the juridical sense of the word. The argument which we have used in an
analogous question may be used here: Suppose the discovery o
f
the photo
graph to have remained secret; its inventor presents the copies obtained by
its process, without disclosing the mystery; he allows it to be believed that
this copy is obtained by some improvement in the ordinary process o
f print
ing and engraving. Would any one think o
f denying his right? Would not
this copy be put in the same category as other copies, and would the protec
tion o
f
the law be unhesitatingly granted to it? Why change opinions be
cause the process o
f photography is known 2 Has its work not remained the
same? Has it lost anything of its personal character?
“It is almost useless to add—so evident is it—that our theory has the ad
Vantage o
f respecting the rights o
f
each person; for if the photographer has
the property in his proof, his property does not go beyond that, and every
body is none the less free to reproduce the same subject. Why not leave to
him the property in the work which he has conceived and executed ? Why
encourage the piracy o
f
his rivals? What good does society derive?”
DESCRIPTIVE ADVERTISEMENTs. It was adjudged in England in 1872
that there could be no copyright in a descriptive advertisement, illustrated
o
r otherwise, o
f
articles which any one might sell." In that case an uphol
sterer had published an illustrated furnishing guide, with engravings o
f
the
articles o
f furniture which he sold, and descriptive remarks thereon. A bill
was filed to restrain another upholsterer from publishing, for the purpose o
f
his own trade, a similar work, in which many o
f
the said engravings were
alleged to be copied. And it was held that he could not be restrained
from copying illustrations which were merely descriptive o
f
his stock, o
r o
f
common articles o
f furniture. Lord ROMILLY, M. R., declared: “At the last
it always comes round to this: that, in fact, there is no copyright in an adver
tisement. If you copy the advertisement of another, you do him no wrong,
unless in so doing you lead the public to believe that you sell the articles o
f
the person whose advertisement you copy.” In a case decided two years
afterwards,” it appeared that a cemetery stone-mason employed and remu
nerated a person to collect monumental designs, and published a book con
taining sketches o
f
such designs, with scarcely any letterpress. It was held
that a tradesman who employed another, for renumeration, to compile a book
o
f designs for him, was himself entitled to copyright in the book, and that a
book in the nature o
f
an advertising catalogue might be the subject o
f copy
right. The distinction between the two cases seems to be that in the latter
case the subject-matter was a book, which had a value as a book o
f refer
ence, while in the former case it was a simple catalogue of articles offered
for sale. -
In this country it was held 3 that an advertising card, devised for the pur
pose o
f displaying paints o
f
various colors, “consisting o
f
a sheet o
f paper
having attached thereto square bits o
f paper painted in various colors, each
square having a different color, with some lithographic work surrounding
the squares advertising the sale o
f
the colors,” was not the subject o
f copy
1 Cobbett v
. Woodward, L. R. 14 Eq. 407. 3 Ehret v. Pierce, 10 Fed. Rep. 553; S. C
.
1
8
* Grace v
. Newman, L. R. 19 Eu. 023. Blatcht. 302.
602 FEDERAL REPORTER,
right. “True, it has lithographic work upon it,” said BENEDICT, J.
,
“and
also words and sentences; but it has none of the characteristics of a work of
art, o
r o
f
a literary production. It is an advertisement, and nothing more.
Aside from its functions as an advertisement o
f
the Morris paints, it has no
value.”
In a subsequent case it was decided, in the circuit court for the southern
district of New York, that a chromo, which was a meritorious work of art,
might be copyrighted, though designed and used for gratuitous distribution as
an advertisement for the purpose o
f attracting business." It was designed,
said the court, as a symbolic glorification o
f lager-beer drinking. In the cen
ter was a conspicuous figure o
f King Gambrinus, his left arm resting upon a
keg o
f lager, the right holding up a foaming glass o
f
beer. On either side of
him were a dozen figures o
f persons representing various classes in life, into
whose eager hands his page was distributing the beer. “This chromo, b
y
it
s
subject, its brilliant coloring, its excellent finish, and the artistic grouping of
its figures, forms a striking picture, suitable for hanging in saloons, and well
calculated to draw attention to the plaintiff, whose name is printed in large
type beneath the figures as a person engaged in the lager-beer business, and
constituting, therefore, a valuable mode o
f advertising.” The distinction
between this case and that o
f
Ehret v. Pierce, supra, and Cobbett v. Woodward,
supra, lies in the fact that it was not a mere print or engraving of an article
offered for sale. It was in itself a work of the imagination, possessing artis
tic qualities. And the court laid down the proposition that when the work
in question was clearly one o
f
artistic merit, it was not material whether the
person claiming the copyright expected to obtain his reward directly through
a sale o
f
the copies, o
r indirectly through a
n
increase o
f profits in his business,
to be obtained through their gratuitous distribution.
PRINTs. In Rosenbach v. Dreyfuss,” the question was whether “prints of
small balloons, with printing for embroidery and cutting lines,” and “prints
o
f hanging baskets, with printing for embroidery and cutting lines,” were
subject to copyright. The form o
f
the different parts o
f
the balloon was
marked out with lines showing how the paper was to be cut to make the dif
ferent parts fi
t together, so as to construct o
f
them a balloon, and with marks
showing how and where they might be embroidered. It was held not subject
to copyright as being a “print,” within the meaning of the statute. “It (the
word ‘print’) means, apparently, a picture; something complete in itself, sin
ilar in kind to an engraving, cut, o
r photograph. It clearly does not mean
something printed o
n paper, that is not intended for use as a picture, but is
itself to be cut up and embroidered, and thus made into an entirely different
article, as a balloon o
r hanging basket.” It was also held that they did not
come within the clause, “models or designs intended to be perfected as works
of the fine arts.”
PROTECTION LIMITED TO NATIVE ART. The claim has been recently ad
vanced that the act o
f
1870 (Rev. St. § 4952) authorizes a citizen or resident
o
f
this country, if he be “proprietor” of any book, map, print, etc., to obtain
a copyright therefor, although the author, inventor, o
r designer was an alien.
The literal reading o
f
the section o
f
the act does not require that both th
e
“author’’ and the “proprietor” shall be citizens or residents of the United
States. Owing to the peculiar phraseology o
f
the statute, it was claimed that
a
s to “paintings, drawings, chromos, statues, statuary, and models,” a “pro
prietor” might obtain a copyright, though the artist or author was an alien,
But the court held that such a holding would involve a reversal of the policy
o
f
the government from it
s foundation, to protect American artists and
1 Yuengling v
. Schile, 12 Fed. Rep. 97. 22 Fed. Rep. 217.
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authors only; and that the word “proprietor,” as used in the copyright laws,
ment the representative of an artist or author who might himself obtain a
copyright.1 HENRY WADE ROGERS.
1Yuengling v. Schile, 12 Fed. Rep. 97.
SchREIBER and others, who sue as well for the United States as
for themselves, v. THORNTON.”
(District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania. April 24, 1883.)
1. CoPYRIGHT-Copying AND PUBLISHING CopyRIGHTED PHOTOGRAPH-CONSTI
TUTIONALITY OF REv. ST. §§ 4952 AND 4965–Power OF CONGRESS To SECURE
CoPYRIGHT TO PROPRIETort of A PHOTOGRAPH.
The act of congress (Rev. St. §§ 4952 and 4965) securing a copyright to the
proprietor of a photograph, and imposing a penalty for the infringement of
such copyright, is constitutional.
2. QUI TAM Action—PENALTY FoR THE INFRINGEMENT of CopyRIGHT TO THE
PROPRIEToRs of A PHotograph.
In an action by several persons, being the proprietors of a duly copyrighted
photograph, to recover, as well for the United States as for themselves, the
penalty for infringement provided by section 4965, it appeared that the de
fendant had caused lithographic copies of the photograph to be made, of which
14,800 were found in his possession or control. Held, that the defendant was
liable
tº
a penalty of one dollar for each copy so found in his possession or
COntrol.
Motion for a New Trial.
This was a qui tam action, pursuant to section 4965, Rev. St.,
brought by Francis Schreiber and others, suing as well for the United
States as for themselves, against Edward B. Thornton, to recover a
statutory penalty for the copying, printing, publishing, selling, and
exposing to sale by the defendant of a photograph, copyrighted by
plaintiffs. The defendant pleaded “not guilty.” The facts appear
ing upon the trial were similar to those disclosed by the evidence in
a former trial for the same matter, and fully reported in Schreiber v.
Sharpless, 6 FED. REP. 175. The plaintiffs, being photographers,
had made and copyrighted, as proprietors, a certain photograph, the
title thereof being “The Mother Elephant ‘Hebe' and her baby Amer
icus,' the first known to have been born in captivity in the world.
Born at Philadelphia, United States, March 10, 1880. The property of
Cooper and Bailey.” Notice of the copyright was printed on each
copy of the photograph. The defendant had charge of the dry goods
department of the business house of Sharpless & Sons, dealing in
general merchandise, and desired a new label for certain goods. He
purchased one of plaintiff's photographs, took it to a lithographer,
and caused a lithographic copy thereof to be made, and 15,200 copies
*Reported by Albert B. Guilbert, Esq., of the Philadelphia bar.- * -
